How do you revise your belief set with %$;@*? by Arisaka, Ryuta
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
05
38
1v
3 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 27
 Ja
n 2
01
6
How do you revise your belief set with %$£;@*?
Abstract
In the classic AGM belief revision theory, beliefs
are static and do not change their own shape. For
instance, if p is accepted by a rational agent, it will
remain p to the agent. But such rarely happens to
us. Often, when we accept some information p,
what is actually accepted is not the whole p, but
only a view of it; not necessarily because we select
the portion but because p must be perceived. Only
the perceived p is accepted; and the perception is
subject to what we already believe (know). What
may, however, happen to the rest of p that initially
escaped our attention? In this work we argue that
the invisible part is also accepted to the agent, if
only unconsciously. Hence some parts of p are ac-
cepted as visible, while some other parts as latent,
beliefs. The division is not static. As the set of be-
liefs changes, what were hidden may become vis-
ible. We present a perception-based belief theory
that incorporates latent beliefs.
1 Introduction
In the classic AGM belief revision theory
[Alchourro´n et al., 1985], what a rational agent is com-
mitted to believe [Levi, 1991] forms his/her belief set X of
formal sentences, which is usually assumed consistent and
closed under logical consequences. To X an input P , again
some (hopefully consistent) sentence, is passed. If P is not
in conflict with beliefs in X , it is simply incorporated into X
without any prior operations. If not, however, the simplistic
augmentation leads to inconsistency. In such situations,
minimal changes are made to X beforehand. Then the
result is a consistent set. Either way, the new belief set is
postulated to include P (success postulate), to be consistent
unless P itself is inconsistent, and to be closed under logical
consequences. This is roughly what it takes in the AGM
belief revision.
Some of the subsequent works have felt that there
are parts in the AGM theory that may be over-
simplified. The success postulate, for instance, has
been questioned on the grounds that when one re-
ceives a new piece of information, it is hardly the case
that he/she accepts it unconditionally [Makinson, 1997;
Hansson et al., 2001; Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999;
Booth et al., 2012; Ma and Liu, 2011]. Others have pointed
out that the assumption of closure of X by logical conse-
quences should be relaxed, for even though two rational
agents both commit to believe the same belief set, they may
primarily believe some sub-set of it. They argue that such
variance should have an effect on the outcome of a belief
revision. Some others point out that the activity of belief
revision should be understood more in sequence than as
a one-off snapshot [Craig Boutilier, 1993; Nayak, 1994;
Rott and Pagnucco, 2000; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997;
Ma et al., 2010], countenancing that an epistemic state
a rational agent is in should not be the same before and after
a revision, and that the epistemic state should determine
how the next revision is carried out. Still some others
reflect that a belief can be not only revised but also updated
[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992]. In case of belief revision,
agents are discovering about the world they are put in. But
the world itself may change, in correspondence to which
beliefs of a rational agent’s also alter. To sum up, after
so much was achieved in [Alchourro´n et al., 1985], still so
much is being investigated around the logical foundation of
belief revision. In this work of ours, we consider the relation
between beliefs and agents’ perception about them. As Ma
et al. showed in [Ma et al., 2010], in a perception-based
model we can assume that what agents accept is not P but
what P appears to him/her. We retain the promising feature
in our approach. However, we also argue and consequently
model that rational agents are, in reality, accepting what may
potentially come to be P , even if only his/her perception of
it was originally accepted. Roughly, our belief acceptance
model is as follows.
1. A belief base consists of two types of beliefs. One com-
prises all that are reachable by the rational agent through
logical consequences. This type forms a belief base in the
traditional AGM sense. The other comprises all the other
beliefs associated to the visible beliefs, which are there,
but which are not presently visible to the rational agent.
These may be called latent beliefs.1
2. There comes an external information {P}⋄. It is a collec-
1The interpretation of a latent belief varies. In [Altman, 2006],
for instance, it is explained as a belief that can be introspectively
discovered. In this work, such a belief is considered visible.
tion of propositions, and corresponds to an input P in the
traditional AGM sense. Whatever the content of the belief
set is, P out of {P}⋄ is always accepted. P is therefore
some essence of the external information {P}⋄. All the
other propositions are attributive to P . How many of them
the rational agent sees depends on what beliefs are visible
to him/her in his/her belief set.
3. Upon acceptance of {P}⋄, therefore, the visible part of
{P}⋄ is accepted into the agent’s belief set. If any of them
contradicts his/her existing visible beliefs, then a necessary
belief contraction first takes place. However, the invisible
part of {P}⋄ is also accepted as latent beliefs.
4. The visible part of {P}⋄, meanwhile, may stimulate ex-
isting latent beliefs in the agent’s belief set, making them
visible.
By 1. a belief set in this model is larger than one in the tradi-
tional model, since it also contains latent beliefs. By 3. even
though only the part of an external information visible to a
rational agent is consciously accepted into his/her belief set,
the remaining are also unconsciously accepted. We now look
into some details of our model.
Justification of the essence of external information In our
perception model, the visible part of the belief set of a rational
agent in a way represents his/her mind. The mind determines
how an external information appears to him/her. Suppose
now, however, that every visible belief in his/her belief set
had come originally from the external world. Then there must
have been a moment when he/she had no beliefs in his/her be-
lief set. Thence arises a question. Given {P}⋄, what of {P}⋄,
provided that it can be believed, does the empty mind accept,
and how does he/she do it? Our supposition is that it must
be accepted almost axiomatically. Perhaps an example helps
here. Suppose a situation where we are instructed to have
{Px}⋄ = iw+mIa
p
dˆ, as our belief. It does not appear at
all like a belief. But anyway we are accepting it as such, for
we are instructed to do so. Now, acceptance of iw+mIa pdˆ
in this manner should not reveal so much about that which
iw+mIa
p
dˆ is. In case the mind is empty, the revelation
should be minimal. The minimal revelation is the essence of
external information. Px for {Px}⋄ is chosen to be it. It is
meant to imitate the Kant’s Form [Kant, 2008] for beliefs.
Justification of latent beliefs If it must be the case that
iw+mIa
p
dˆ be categorically accepted as a belief, we, our-
selves as a rational agent, go ahead and do so. Suppose that
Px is ‘iw+mIa pdˆ is a belief.’, and that it was consciously
accepted into our belief set X . Now, suppose that we sub-
sequently search on web (Further Acquisition of Beliefs) to
identify that iw+mIa pdˆ means ‘The bird eats.’ in English
translation. By this time our belief set is X ′, and we have a
revealed attributive belief to iw+mIa pdˆ, namely, ‘The bird
eats.’ and also ‘ iw+mIa pdˆ means The bird eats. ’. Evi-
dently, they are a part of that which iw+mIa pdˆ is, stimu-
lated to come to the conscious mind by some external infor-
mation. It would be strange to think that the possibility that
they would become visible emerged all of a sudden at X ′.
The possibility was already there at X as a potential. This in-
dicates that by accepting an external information, which can
be but a view of it in fact, a rational agent unconsciously also
accepts the external belief as a larger construct, even though
much may remain hidden to him/her for a prolonged period.
This is the justification of the use of latent beliefs.
Associations Now, because latent beliefs cannot be con-
sciously found, they also cannot be found through logical
consequences of visible beliefs. We therefore need to have
another kind of links that connect beliefs. For our purposes,
they are called associations. Specifically, given three propo-
sitions (beliefs) P1, P2 and P3, P1 is said to be associated to
P3 through P2, provided (1) that neither P2 nor P3 is a logi-
cal consequence of P1, (2) that P1 is a logical consequence of
neither P2 nor P3, and (3) that P3 becomes visible in case P2
is held visible in the agent’s belief set. In case P2 is not vis-
ible, P3 is a latent belief. We shall denote the connection by
the notation P1(P2, P3). {P1}⋄ then comprises P1 and cer-
tain number of P1(P2, P3) attributive to P1. The P1(P2, P3)
is basically P3 if an agent can see P3. Therefore it might be
properer to call P3 an attributive belief instead of P1(P2, P3).
But for our purposes, we will simply call the latter an attribu-
tive belief (to P1). An attributive belief P (P1, P2), unlike
‘P1 implies P2’, or ‘P2 holds if a belief set is revised with
P1’ [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], is inevitably dependent on
P , and is a part of {P}⋄.
Outlines, contributions, related works and other remarks
To speak of our approach, we represent belief sets and exter-
nal information both as a set of propositional formulas and
of triples of them, and present corresponding postulates to
the AGM postulates. There are of course more to be desired.
Nonetheless, it is a reasonable point to begin our modelling
with. Adaptation to other representations can be sought af-
ter later. We formalise our ideas in Section 2. In Section 3,
we present postulates for belief expansion, contraction, and
revision, and observe an interesting phenomenon that even
if visible beliefs and an external information are both con-
sistent, the result of belief revision can lead to an inconsistent
belief set. Informally, suppose iw+mIa pdˆ again. It is orig-
inally accepted intoX as Px. Suppose thatX has (rather irra-
tionally) ‘It is not the case that the bird eats.’ Then of course
acceptance of iw+mIa pdˆ would be contradictory to one
of the beliefs in X . However, it is not contradictory at X ,
since to X , only a non-contradictory view of it is available.
However, at X ′, some external information reveals a hitherto
hidden part of iw+mIa pdˆ, namely, ‘The bird eats.’ Hence
at X ′, it turns out that X ′ is inconsistent; furthermore it turns
out that it (should) have been all along inconsistent from the
moment it was accepted. We may say that a potential incon-
sistency was materialised at X ′ through revelation of a latent
belief attributive to an existing belief. Compared to the in-
consistency in a typical belief revision theory that is caused
by a new information contradicting old beliefs, the inconsis-
tency that we have just mentioned may be already in the old
beliefs.
As far as can be gathered from existing works in this re-
search field, the idea that we have gone through, i.e. the in-
corporation of the kind of latent beliefs and of their revelation
through acquisition of beliefs, is new, and in a way models
our inspiration which is often triggered by seemingly unre-
lated information. Typically, agents in belief revision the-
ory accept an external information as that which it really is.
But that cannot be generally achievable in our model. Ma
et al. [Ma et al., 2010], on the other hand, explicitly looks
at a perception model, albeit belief revision not on propo-
sitions but on possible-world-based epistemic states. How-
ever, their model focuses on agents’ interpretation of uncer-
tain inputs, not on the latent beliefs: in their work, belief re-
vision is subject to the perceived inputs, but the parts that
are imperceptible at the time of belief revision have no ef-
fect on the result of a belief revision. Also, as they note,
external information being represented as epistemic states,
conjunction of two epistemic states are undefinable in their
method. It is also the case, at least for now, that they have
dealt only with belief revision, while expansion and contrac-
tion are left for a future work. We present all the three, and
show the relations between them just as in the AGM the-
ory. It could be that our approach may turn out to be use-
ful also for addressing some of the technical challenges in
their work. Several works [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991;
Benferhat et al., 2005; Ma et al., 2012] consider cases where
an agent may have several views about his/her beliefs. But
these are concerned with agents’ certainty about their beliefs,
not about latent beliefs. We will conclude our work in Section
4 with an example.
2 Formalisation
Readers are referred to Section 1 for the intuition of the
key notations. We assume a set of possibly uncountably
many atomic propositions. We denote the set by P , and re-
fer to each element by the letter p with or without a sub-
script. More general propositions are constructed from P
and the logical connectives of propositional classical logic:
{⊤0,⊥0,¬1,∧2,∨2}. The subscripts denote the arity. We
do not specifically use the classical implication ⊃2, but it is
derivable in the usual manner from ∨ and ¬, as p0 ⊃ p1 ≡
¬p0 ∨ p1. We denote the set of literals by Lit. We denote
the set of all the propositions by Props, and refer to each
element by P with or without a subscript. These model be-
liefs. In the rest, we use the two terms: propositions and be-
liefs, almost interchangeably. We only prefer to use ‘propo-
sition’ when external information is involved, and ‘belief’
when the proposition is in a belief set. To model the con-
cept of associations among propositions/beliefs, we also de-
fine what we call attributive propositions/beliefs. Let us as-
sume that, given any O ⊆ 2Props, L(O) is the set of all the
propositions that are the logical consequences of any (pairs
of) elements in O. We say that a set of propositions/beliefs
U is consistent iff for any P ∈ Props, if P ∈ U , then
¬P 6∈ U , and if ¬P ∈ U , then P 6∈ U . We assume that,
given any pair of some sets (U1, U2), pi0((U1, U2)) = U1 and
pi1((U1, U2)) = U2. We further assume that the union of two
pairs of sets: (U1, U2) ∪ (U ′1, U ′2) is (U1 ∪ U ′1, U2 ∪ U ′2).
Definition 1 (Associations and attributive beliefs). We define
an association tuple to be a tuple (I, X,Assoc) where I is a
mapping from Lit to 2Props×Props; X is an element of 2Props;
and Assoc is a mapping from Props to 2Props×Props. Let
Exc be a mapping from Props to 2Props such that Exc(P ) =
L({P})∪{P1 ∈ Props | P ∈ L({P1})}. Then I is defined to
satisfy that, for any P ∈ Lit, if either P1 ∈ Exc(P ) or P2 ∈
Exc(P ), then (P1, P2) 6∈ I(P ). Assoc is defined to satisfy
(1) that if P is a tautology, then Assoc(P ) = (∅, ∅); (2) that
if P is inconsistent, i.e. ¬P is a tautology, then Assoc(P ) =
(Props,Props); and (3) that, if neither,
1. Assoc(P ) = I(P ) if P ∈ Lit. Explanation: The association
links are obtained recursively, and so it suffices that I be
defined only for the elements of Lit.
2. Assoc(P1∧P2) = (Assoc(P1)∪Assoc(P2)) ↓ Exc(P1∧P2)
where (U1, U2) ↓ U3 = (U ′1, U ′2) such that U ′1,2 = U1,2\U3.
Explanation: P1 and P2 each has certain set of attributive
beliefs/propositions, say UP1 and respectivelyUP2 . Then it
is more natural to think that the elements of UP1 ∪UP2 are
recognised attributive to P1 ∧ P2. The only exceptions are
those beliefs/propositions which are connected to P1 ∧ P2
by logical consequences. These are excluded.
3. Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) = Assoc(P1 ∧ P2) if P1, P2 ∈ X . Expla-
nation: In this paper, that a belief/proposition is in some
X means, informally, that it is a [held belief]/[true propo-
sition] in X , as to be evidenced in the next section. Now,
if both P1 and P2 are held/true in X , then there is only a
locutionary difference between P1 ∨ P2 and P1 ∧ P2.
4. Assoc(P1 ∨P2)=Assoc(Pi) if ¬Pj ∈X for i, j∈{1, 2}, i 6=j.
Explanation: If ¬Pj is in X , then if X is consistent at
all, P1 ∨ P2 is a [held belief]/[true proposition] in X just
because Pi is a [held belief]/[true proposition] in X .
5. Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) = Assoc(Pi) ↓ Exc(P1 ∧ P2) if Pi ∈ X
and Pj ,¬Pj 6∈ X for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Explanation: If
Pi is in X , but not the other or negation of the other, then the
rational agent holding X may or may not believe Pj . But any
pair (Px, Py) which is in the set on the right hand side of the
equation is included in either of the two cases, and is safe to
assume.
6. Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) consists of all the pairs (Px, Py) satisfying the
following, otherwise: there exists (Pa, PA) in Assoc(P1) and
there exists (Pb, PB) in Assoc(P2) such that (1) Px = Pa; (2)
L(Pa) = L(Pb); (3) either PB ∈ L(PA) or PA ∈ L(PB); (4)
if PB ∈ L(PA), then Py = PB , else if PA ∈ L(PB), then
Py = PA; and (5) Px, Py 6∈ Exc(P1 ∧ P2). Explanation: For
the other cases, if X is consistent at all, then it is not clear
if Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) is Assoc(P1 ∧ P2) or Assoc(Pi), i ∈
{1, 2}. But if Py becomes visible under the same condition
(Px) in each of the three cases, then we know that (Px, Py)
is a pair that is safe to assume.
7. Assoc(¬(P1 ∧ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2).
8. Assoc(¬(P1 ∨ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2).
Now, assume that P is a proposition/belief which is neither
tautological nor inconsistent. Let us call each P (P1, P2) for
some P, P1, P2 ∈ Props a belief triplet, and let us denote
the set of belief triplets by BTriplet. Then we define the set
{P (P1, P2) ∈ BTriplet | [(P1, P2) ∈ Assoc(P )] ∧† Assoc(P ) 6=
(Props,Props)]}2 to be the set of propositions/beliefs attribu-
tive to P . We denote the set by Cond(P ). We denote⋃
P∈Props Cond(P ) simply by Cond.
2In lengthy formal expressions, we use meta-connectives
∧†,∨†,→†,∀,∃ in place for conjunction, disjunction and material
implication, universal quantification and existential quantification,
each following the semantics in classical logic.
Belief expansion
1.Cˆn(Bˆ)+ˆPˆ = Cˆn(Cˆn(Bˆ) ∪ Pˆ ).
Belief contraction Belief revision
1.Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ = Cˆn(Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ ) (Closure). 1.Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ = Cˆn(Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ ) (Closure).
2.Pˆ 6∈ Cˆn(∅)→† Pˆ 6∈ Cˆn(Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ ) (Success). 2.Pˆ ∈ Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ (Success).
3.Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ ⊆ Cˆn(Bˆ) (Inclusion). 3.Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ ⊆ Cˆn(Bˆ)+ˆPˆ (Inclusion).
4.Pˆ 6∈ Cˆn(Bˆ)→† Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ = Cˆn(Bˆ) (Vacuity). 4.[¬Pˆ 6∈ Cˆn(Bˆ)]→† [Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ = Cˆn(Bˆ)+ˆPˆ ] (Vacuity).
5.[Pˆ1 ↔ Pˆ2 ∈ Cˆn(∅)] →† [Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ1 = Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ2]
(Extensionality).
5.[Pˆ1 ↔ Pˆ2 ∈ Cˆn(∅)] →† [Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ1 = Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ2]
(Extensionality).
6.Cˆn(Bˆ) ⊆ (Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ )+ˆPˆ (Recovery). 6.Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ is consistent if Pˆ is consistent (Consistency).
7∗.[Pˆ1 6∈ Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆ(Pˆ1 ∧ Pˆ2)] →† [Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆ(Pˆ1 ∧ Pˆ2) ⊆
Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ1] (Conjunctive inclusion).
7∗.Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆ(Pˆ1 ∧ Pˆ2) ⊆ (Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ1)+ˆPˆ2 (Super-
expansion).
8∗.(Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ1) ∩ (Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆPˆ2) ⊆ Cˆn(Bˆ)÷ˆ(Pˆ1 ∧ Pˆ2)
(Conjunctive overlap).
8∗.[Pˆ1 6∈ Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ2] →† [(Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆPˆ2)+ˆPˆ1 ⊆
Cˆn(Bˆ)∗ˆ(Pˆ1 ∧ Pˆ2)] (Sub-expansion).
Figure 1: The AGM postulates for belief expansion, contraction and revision. The last two postulates for belief contraction and
for belief revision are supplementary postulates that regulate belief retention. Pˆ1 ↔ Pˆ2 is an abbreviation of (¬Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ2) ∧
(¬Pˆ2 ∨ Pˆ1).
Observe that there is no belief attributive to a tautological or
an inconsistent belief.
To characterise rational agents, let us denote 2Props ×
2BTriplet by BBase, and call each element of BBase a belief
base. We denote any element of BBase by B with or with-
out a subscript. Instead of working directly on a belief base,
however, just as in the AGM theory we represent a rational
agent as some belief set.
Definition 2 (Belief sets). Let Cn be a closure operator on
BBase such thatCn(B) is the least fixpoint ofCnk(B) (k ≥
0), defined by:
• pi0(Cn
0(B)) = L(pi0(B)).
• pi1(Cn
k(B)) =
⋃
P∈pi0(Cnk(B))
Cond(P )
• pi0(Cn
k+1(B)) = L(pi0(Cnk(B)) ∪ Ak).
where Ak = {P2 | [P (P1, P2) ∈ pi1(Cnk(B))] ∧† [P1 ∈
pi0(Cn
k(B))]}. Cn(B) is assumed compact. We say that a
belief base B is closed iff B = Cn(B). We call any closed
belief base a belief set.
Informal explanation: B and Cni(B) have two components,
the first of which contains propositions, and the second of
which contains belief triplets. The starting point for the fix-
point iteration is Cn0(B). The first component of Cn0(B),
i.e. pi0(Cn0(B)), contains all the propositions as result
from taking the L closure on pi0(B). The second component
of Cn0(B), i.e. pi1(Cn0(B)), contains all the associated
attributive propositions to each proposition in pi0(Cn0(B)).
In the next round of Cn application to Cn0(B) to obtain
Cn1(B), we first obtain a set of propositions, A0. If P ∈ A0,
then (1) P occurs in Cn0(B) as Px(Py, P ) for some Px and
some Py , and (2) the Py occurs in Cn0(B). The A0 is added
to the first component ofCn0(B), which is then closed under
logical consequences. This set is the first component of
Cn1(B). The second component of Cn1(B) then contains
all the attributive beliefs associated to them. This process is
repeated, eventually reaching the fixpoint, Cn(B). 
Observation 1 (Adequacy). For any belief set Cn(B) and
for any P ∈ Props, if P 6∈ Cn(B), then Cn(B) does not
contain any beliefs attributive to P .3
A belief set Cn(B) is the representation of what a ratio-
nal agent holding it is committed to believe. For the exter-
nal information, we assume that every piece of such infor-
mation is a set of propositions with one primary proposition
P and other (zero or more) propositions attributive to P , i.e.
{P}⋄ = ({P},Cond(P )). The receiving agent may or may
not notice of any of the attributive propositions in {P}⋄ at
the time he/she accepts {P}⋄. That depends on pi0(Cn(B)).
Let us denote by VisibleB({P}⋄) the part of {P}⋄ visible
to Cn(B). Specifically, VisibleB({P}⋄) is defined to be
P ∪ {P2 |[P (P1, P2) ∈ pi1({P}
⋄)] ∧† [P1 ∈ pi0(Cn(B))]}.
3 Postulates and Representations
We first of all state one postulate about the relation between
an association tuple and a belief set.
1. For any belief set Cn(B), (I, pi0(Cn(B)),Assoc) is the
association tuple for it.
We have two principles for expansion. The AGM postulates
for expansion, contraction and revision are listed in Figure
1 for easy comparisons. Cˆn is a closure operator by logi-
cal consequences; Bˆ is a set of propositions; Pˆ is a propo-
sition as an external information, i.e. all in the AGM sense
[Alchourro´n et al., 1985].
1. Cn(B) + {P}⋄ = Cn(Cn(B)∪ {P}⋄) (Augmentation).
2. If the association tuple for Cn(B) is
(I, pi0(Cn(B)),Assoc), then that to Cn(B) + {P}⋄
is (I, pi0(Cn(B) + {P}⋄),Assoc) (Association update).
3Adequacy may better be a postulate on its own than be inte-
grated into Cn. We choose this way here only because it keeps the
number of postulates on par with that in the AGM theory.
The postulates for contraction are as follows.
1. Cn(B)÷ {P}⋄ = Cn(Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄) (Closure).
2. ∀P1 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).P1 6∈ pi0(Cn(∅)) →† P1 6∈
pi0(Cn(B) ÷ {P}
⋄) (Success). Explanation: If a propo-
sition that is visible to Cn(B) is not a tautology, then it is
not in the contracted set.
3. Cn(B)÷ {P}⋄ ⊆ Cn(B) (Inclusion). Explanation: The
belief set to result through belief contraction is a sub-set
of the initial belief set.
4. (∀Pa ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).Pa 6∈ pi0(Cn(B)) ∨† Pa ∈
pi0(Cn(∅))) →
† Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄ = Cn(B) (Vacuity). Ex-
planation: If all the visible propositions of an external
information are either a tautology or a proposition not
in Cn(B), then the belief contraction does not modify
Cn(B).
5. [L(VisibleB({P1}⋄)) = L(VisibleB({P2}⋄))] →† [Cn(B) ÷
{P1}
⋄ = Cn(B) ÷ {P2}
⋄] (Extensionality). Explana-
tion: If VisibleB({P1}⋄) and VisibleB({P2}⋄) are indis-
tinguishable in content, then contractingCn(B) by {P1}⋄
or by {P2}⋄ is the same.
6. Cn(B) ⊆ (Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄) + (VisibleB({P}⋄), ∅) (Recov-
ery). Explanation: If the contracted belief set is expanded
with the beliefs that have been removed, then the belief
set contains all the beliefs in the original belief set.
7. If the association tuple for Cn(B) is
(I, pi0(Cn(B)),Assoc), then that for Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄ is
(I, pi0(Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄),Assoc) (Association update).
There is no gratuitous recovery, however. Compare it to Re-
covery in Figure 1.
Observation 2. There is no guarantee that we have
Cn(B) ⊆ (Cn(B)÷ {P}⋄) + {P}⋄.
The reason is; if a belief set and a contracted belief set of its
are not identical, then the association tuple associated to each
of them can be different.
In line with the AGM representation of the postulates, we
define a mapping △ from belief sets and propositions into
belief sets. For any belief set Cn(B) and any incoming infor-
mation {P}⋄, we say that Cn(B1) satisfying pi0(Cn(B1)) ⊆
pi0(Cn(B)) is a maximal subset of Cn(B) for {P}⋄ iff
1. For any P1 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄), P1 6∈ pi0(Cn(B1)) if P1
is not a tautology.
2. For any Cn(B2), if pi0(Cn(B1)) ⊂ pi0(Cn(B2)) ⊆
pi0(Cn(B)), then there exists some Pa ∈
VisibleB({P}⋄) such that Pa ∈ pi0(Cn(B2)).
3. Cn(B) = Cn(B1 ∪ (VisibleB({P}⋄), ∅)).4
We define △(Cn(B), {P}⋄) to be the set of all the sub-
sets of Cn(B) maximal for {P}⋄. We further define a
function γ, so that, if △(Cn(B), {P}⋄) is not empty, then
γ(△(Cn(B), {P}⋄)) is a sub-set of △(Cn(B), {P}⋄); or if
it is empty, it is simply Cn(B).
4This condition is derivable from the first two in the AGM the-
ory; but not here, which is therefore explicitly stated.
Theorem 1 (Representation theorem of belief contraction).
Let Cn(B) be a belief set. Then, it follows that Cn(B) ÷
{P}⋄ =
⋂
(γ(△(Cn(B), {P}⋄))).
Proof. Note that the postulates modulo association
tuple can be reduced down to package contraction
[Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1997] of VisibleB({P}⋄).
However, we show cases of one direction of the proof
with details for not very straightforward ones. We
show that for any particular belief set as results from
Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄, there exists some particular γ such that
Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄ =
⋂
(γ(△(Cn(B), {P}⋄))). Suppose, by
way of showing contradiction, that there exists some α
which is either some belief Pa or some attributive be-
lief Pa(Pb, Pc) such that α ∈ Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄ and that
α 6∈ pii(
⋂
(γ(∆(Cn(B), {P}⋄)))), where i is 0 or 1, depend-
ing on which α is. Suppose α = Pa. By Closure and Inclu-
sion, we have that α ∈ pi0(Cn(B)). Now, we consider two
cases: α is a tautology, or otherwise. In the latter case, there
are two possibilities: (1) For all Py ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄), we
have either that Py is a tautology or that Py 6∈ pi0(Cn(B));
(2) There is Py ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄) such that Py ∈ Cn(B)
and that it is not a tautology. For the second case, de-
fine Conflict to be ⋃for all such Py ({Px ∈ Cn(B) | Py ∈
L(Px)} ∪ {Pu ∈ Cn(B) | [L(Pu) = L(Px ∨ Pw)] ∧† [Py ∈
L(Px)] ∧† [∃¬Pz ∈ Cn(B).Pz ∈ L(Pw)]}). Then by Success,
α 6∈ Conflict. There are two sub-cases here. If α ∈ L(Py)
such that L(Py) 6= L(α) for some such Py , then by the first
condition of maximality, we can choose γ appropriately
so that any selected maximal sub-set(s) include α; contra-
diction to the supposition. Otherwise, we have that α ∈
(Cn(B)\Conflict)\{Pe ∈ L(Py) | [Py ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄)]}.
Contradiction is by the third condition of maximality.
Similarly when α = Pa(Pb, Pc).
We finally list postulates for belief revision. When
one is revising a belief set, he/she is conscious of the
propositions within {P}⋄ that are visible to him/her. If
his/her belief set Cn(B) should contain any contradicting
beliefs to them, they should be removed. Hence, revi-
sion of Cn(B) by {P}⋄, which we denote by Cn(B) ∗
{P}⋄, perform belief contraction by Visible−B({P}⋄)
on Cn(B), where Visible−B({P}⋄) is defined to be
{¬Pa | Pa ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄)}. However, then not
{P}⋄ but (VisibleB({P}⋄),
⋃
Px∈VisibleB({P}⋄) Cond(Px)))
expands the contracted belief set.
1. Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ = Cn(Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄) (Closure).
2. VisibleB({P}⋄) ⊆ pi0(Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄) (Success 1). Ex-
planation: Any visible proposition in external information
is accepted.
3. ∀Px ∈ Visible−B({P}⋄).[Px 6∈ Cn(∅)] →† [Px 6∈ pi0(Cn(B) ∗
{P}⋄)] (Success 2). Explanation: Any belief contradicting
VisibleB({P}⋄) is not in the revised belief set.
4. Cn(B)∗{P}⋄ ⊆ Cn(B)+{P}⋄ (Inclusion). Explanation:
The belief set that results from revising a belief set with
some external information forms a sub-set of the belief set
that results from expanding it with the same information.
5. [∀Px ∈ Visible−B({P}⋄).Px 6∈ pi0(Cn(B))] →† [Cn(B) ∗
{P}⋄ = Cn(B) + {P}⋄] (Vacuity). Explanation: If no
visible propositions of an external information are in con-
flict with any beliefs in Cn(B), then the result of revis-
ing Cn(B) with it is the same as simply expandingCn(B)
with it.
6. [Cn({P1}⋄) = Cn({P2}⋄)] →† [Cn(B) ∗ {P1}⋄ = Cn(B) ∗
{P2}
⋄] (Extensionality). Explanation: If one external in-
formation is identical with another in content under Cn,
then revising Cn(B) with either of them leads to the same
belief set. Note the difference from Extensionality for ÷.
Here latent beliefs also matter.
7. If the association tuple for Cn(B) is
(I, pi0(Cn(B)),Assoc), then that to Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄
is (I, pi0(Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄),Assoc) (Association update).
An analogue of Levi identity [Levi, 1977] does not hold here.
Observation 3. It is not the case that Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ =
(Cn(B) ÷ {¬P}⋄) + {P}⋄.
Also note the following observation.
Observation 4 (No AGM consistency upon revision). Even
if a belief set Cn(B) and all the elements of VisibleB({P}⋄)
are consistent, Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ may be inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose that we have the following belief set:
Cn({p0,¬p2}, {p0(p1, p2)}) and that {P}⋄ = ({p1}, ∅). Sup-
pose that Cond(p0) = {p0(p1, p2)}, that Cond(p1) =
Cond(p2) = ∅, and that none of p0, . . . , p2 are a logical con-
sequence of any others.
Hence, we explicitly have the postulate Success 2 for the re-
moval of beliefs in Cn(B), instead of the implicit removal
through the AGM Consistency postulate. Although out of the
scope of this work, resolution of this kind of inconsistencies
that are triggered by revelation of latent parts of existing be-
liefs is an interesting problem. Despite Observation 3, we
have the following identity theorem.
Theorem 2 (Identity). It holds that
Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ = (Cn(B) ÷ (Visible−B({P}⋄), ∅)) +
(VisibleB({P}⋄),
⋃
Px∈VisibleB({P}⋄) Cond(Px)).
Proof. We show cases of one direction. Details are left to
readers. Let Y denote (Cn(B) ÷ (Visible−B({P}⋄), ∅)) +
(Visible({P}⋄),
⋃
Px∈VisibleB({P}⋄) Cond(Px)) for space.
Show that for any outcome of Y , there is an outcome of
Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ such that Y = Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄. To show
contradiction, suppose some α which is either a belief Pa or
an attributive belief Pa(Pb, Pc). Suppose that α ∈ pii(Y ) and
that α 6∈ Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄. Three cases here: α is a tautology,
α ∈ pii(VisibleB({P}⋄),
⋃
Pz∈VisibleB({P}⋄) Cond({P}
⋄)),
or otherwise. In the last case, there are sub-cases: ei-
ther ∀Py ∈ Visible−B({P}⋄).Py 6∈ pi0(Cn(B)); or
otherwise. For the second case, define Conflict to
be ⋃for all such Py ({Px ∈ Cn(B) | Py ∈ L(Px)} ∪ {Pu ∈
Cn(B) | [L(Pu) = L(Px ∨ Pw)] ∧† [Py ∈ L(Px)] ∧† [∃¬Pz ∈
Cn(B).Pz ∈ L(Pw)]}). By Closure and Success of ÷, we
must have that α 6∈ Conflict. There are two sub-sub-cases:
(A) α ∈ pii(Cn(B) ÷ (Visible−B({P}⋄), ∅)); (B) otherwise.
For the latter, we have, in case α = Pa (similar if it is
Pa(Pb, Pc)), that
∨†
Pz∈Conflict([α ∈ L(Pz)] ∧
† [L(α) 6=
L(Pz)]). That is, L(α) = L(Pz ∨ Pu) 6= L(Pz) for
some Pu. But by Success 1 and Closure of ∗, ¬Pz is in
Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄. Hence by Closure of ∗, Pu and also Pz ∨Pu
are in Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄. Contradiction.
By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we also gain the representa-
tion theorem for belief revision. We may add the following
supplementary postulates. These are all adaptations of the
AGM supplementary postulates (Figure 1). For any P1, P2,
Cn(B) and VisibleB({P}⋄), let us assume for space that
< B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P1 > is almost the same as
VisibleB({P}⋄) except that all the occurrences of
P1 ∧ P2 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄) are replaced with P1.
(For belief contraction)
A ∀P1 ∧ P2 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).[P1 6∈ Cn(B) ÷ {P}⋄] →†
[Cn(B)÷ {P}⋄
⊆ Cn(B)÷ < B,P, P1 ∧P2, P1 > (Conjunctive inclusion).
B ∀P1 ∧ P2 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).(Cn(B) ÷
< B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P1 >) ∩ (Cn(B)÷ < B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P2 >
) ⊆ Cn(B)÷ {P}⋄. (Conjunctive overlap).
(For belief revision)
A ∀P1 ∧ P2 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄ ⊆ (Cn(B)∗ <
B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P1 >) + (P2,Cond(P2)) (Super-expansion).
B ∀P1 ∧ P2 ∈ VisibleB({P}⋄).
[P1 6∈ Cn(B)∗ < B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P2 >] →
† [(Cn(B) ∗
< B,P, P1 ∧ P2, P2 >)+ (P2,Cond(P2)) ⊆ Cn(B) ∗ {P}⋄]
(Sub-expansion).
As in [Alchourro´n et al., 1985], addition of these postu-
lates ensures that γ selects the best elements under some
criteria. Specifically γ(∆(Cn(B), {P}⋄)) = {Cn(Ba) ∈
∆(Cn(B), {P}⋄) | ∀Cn(Bb) ∈ ∆(Cn(B), {P}
⋄).Cn(Bb) 
Cn(Ba)} for a total pre-order over ∆(Cn(B), {P}⋄).
4 Conclusion with a concluding example
Let us conclude this work with an ex-
ample. Suppose a scene in an imaginary
game application. A player can visit
three towns: Town A, Town B and Town
C. In Town A, he/she obtains a box. On
one face of it, there are red, blue and
green buttons, as well as a dark pattern.
There is a key hole in the pattern, as in-
dicated in grey in the right figure. But at
first the spot is black, just as the rest of
the pattern is. Now, if he/she presses the buttons in certain
order - red, blue, red, and then green - the inner machinery
of the box will actuate and the location of the key hole is il-
luminated. Whether or not the key hole is being illuminated,
if a player has a matching key, it can be inserted into the key
hole, and the box will open. Inside the box is a rare item. In
Town B, a player obtains the key. In Town C, he/she obtains
an enigmatic note: ‘red, blue, red, green.’ Now, all of these
are the details known to the game developers, but not to the
first-time game players. Consider the following propositions.
1. p1: I have a key.
2. p2: There is a key hole.
3. p3: I apply the key to the
key hole.
4. p4: I have a box.
5. p5: There are three buttons
and a dragon curve.
6. p6: There are red, blue and
green buttons.
7. p7: I have a note having 4
words on.
8. p8: There are 4 words: red,
blue, red, green, stated in
this order.
9. p9: Pressing buttons: red,
blue, red, and green in this
order opens a box.
10. p10: There is a rare item.
Suppose that a player visits Town B, then Town A, and then
Town C. The first problem (concerning what-is-perceived-
is-all-that-there-is): Suppose that he/she conceives the be-
liefs, p1, p2 ⊃ p3 (in Town B), p4, p5 (in Town A) and p7
(in Town C) in this order. These are his/her perception of
the items. But if we suppose that what is not perceived at
the time of perception will have no effect, then the player,
in Town A, only noted that there were three buttons and a
dragon curve on the box. Now, because the critical infor-
mation, the three colours of the buttons, was not recorded,
he/she, upon seeing the note in Town C, did not notice the
significance of the 4 words. Consequently, he/she conceived
only p7 and not p8. But, then, there is no proper conti-
nuity from p5 ∧ p7 to p9 which he/she does not conceive.
Consequently, with the 5 beliefs, he/she does not open the
box. However, this is at odds with reality: any sensible
game player should have felt p9, even if his/her original per-
ception about the key was p1; about the box was p4 and
p5; and about the note was p7. Treating this case with la-
tent beliefs: Let us suppose the following structures about
the items: Of the key := ({p1}, {p1(p2, p3)}), Of the box :=
({p4 ∧ p5}, {p4 ∧ p5(p8, p6), p4 ∧ p5(p3, p10), p4 ∧ p5(p9, p2)}),
and Of the note := ({p7}, {p7(p5, p8)}). The player accepts
these in this order, which means that he/she consciously sees
p1 about the key and p4 and p5 about the box. About the
note, he/she consciously sees p7 and p8 (the latter is visible
because p5 is visible). But p8 lets p6 about the box to come to
his/her consciousness. Both p6 and p8 being visible, a sensi-
ble player surmises p9. And when it is added to his/her belief
set, he/she discovers p2 about the box. But p2 helps him/her
to conceive p3 about the key, which then reveals that he/she
has had p10 (about the box), as required. The second problem
(concerning dependent beliefs): Suppose that a player con-
ceives p1, p2 ⊃ p3 (in Town B), p4, p5, p6 (in Town A), and
p7, p8, p9 (in Town C). These should be enough to discover
p2 and to have p10 subsequently. But suppose that he/she
drops the key before getting to Town C. Then his/her belief
must be revised with ¬p1. The revision will drop p1. How-
ever, under the AGM belief theory, the revision does not drop
p2 ⊃ p3 (Cf. Recovery in Figure 1). So in Town C, he/she
has¬p1, p2 ⊃ p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8 and p9. He/she presses the
buttons according to p9 and gains p2. Then p2 and p2 ⊃ p3
produces p3. But because he/she has dropped the key, we
must ask here; what key? There is no key. The problem is
that ‘the key’ and ‘the key hole’ in p3 are presupposing the
existence of some key and some key hole. It is generally dif-
ficult to recognise the structure among propositions in propo-
sitional logic. We could avoid this inconvenience by replac-
ing p3 with px: If I have a key and if I have a key hole, then
I apply the key to the key hole. But such replacement would
effectively disallow some natural beliefs of the kind of p3 to
appear as a belief. Also, in cases where it is hard to think of
pα (that is, not of whether it is true, but of it) from one’s ex-
isting knowledge/belief, it is very unnatural to presume that
he/she would nonetheless come up with pα ⊃ pβ . With latent
beliefs: Assume the same belief structures about the items as
before. When the player drops the key and revises his/her
belief set with ¬p1, by Observation 1 (Adequacy), the asso-
ciated p1(p2, p3) is also dropped, which precludes the stated
problem in this setting.
We have presented a new perception model that incorpo-
rates latent beliefs. Expansion of our work with suitable pos-
tulates on iterated belief revision is one obvious direction.
Studies into reasonable resolution of the new kind of incon-
sistencies should be also interesting.
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